The Impact of Labour Rights Commitments in EU Trade Agreements: The Case of Peru by Orbie, Jan et al.
Politics and Governance (ISSN: 2183–2463)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 4, Pages 6–18
DOI: 10.17645/pag.v5i4.1091
Article
The Impact of Labour Rights Commitments in EU Trade Agreements: The
Case of Peru
Jan Orbie *, Lore Van den Putte and Deborah Martens
Centre for EUStudies, Department of Political Science, GhentUniversity, 9000Ghent, Belgium; E-Mails: jan.orbie@ugent.be
(J.O.), lore.vandenputte@ugent.be (L.V.d.P.), deborah.martens@ugent.be (D.M.)
* Corresponding author
Submitted: 3 July 2017 | Accepted: 8 September 2017 | Published: 14 December 2017
Abstract
While the inclusion of labour rights in European Union (EU) trade agreements has become an ‘unobjectionable norm’, anal-
yses of their impact have been largely absent from the literature. This article aims to partly fill this gap in existing research
by examining the impact of labour rights commitments in the EU–Peru–Colombia agreement, with particular reference to
the agricultural sector in Peru. Following a brief background overview of labour rights in agriculture in Peru, we draw up
the analytical framework for assessing the impact of these commitments. We discern three distinctive legal commitments
and find that they are flexible and conservative, also compared to provisions in other EU trade agreements. Subsequently,
we assess the impact of these commitments by analysing to what extent they are being upheld in practice. Empirical ev-
idence from several sources, including field research, shows that the Peruvian government has failed to implement the
labour rights commitments in several respects. In the conclusions, we point to the cautious role of the EU, which has scope
to monitor Peru’s labour rights compliance more proactively.
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1. Introduction
Recent European Union (EU) trade agreements contain a
separate Title on ‘Trade and Sustainable Development’
where the Parties pledge to respect a number of so-
cial and environmental principles. This resonates with
a growing concern that trade agreements should not
only promote economic interests but should also take
broader values into account. While the inclusion of
labour rights in EU trade agreements has become an ‘un-
objectionable norm’ (Van den Putte & Orbie, 2015), anal-
yses of their impact have been largely absent from the
literature. This article aims to partly fill this gap by exam-
ining the impact of labour rights commitments in the EU–
Peru–Colombia agreement, with particular reference to
the agricultural sector in Peru.
Our contribution to existing research is twofold. First,
we provide an analytical framework specifying what ex-
actly the labour rights commitments in the sustainable
development title of the EU–Peru–Colombia agreement
imply. While existing studies have analysed these com-
mitments, this has often been done to illustrate the ab-
sence of enforceability through sanctions. Instead, we
provide amore detailed account of the labour rights com-
mitments. This also involves a comparison with other
recent agreements concluded by the EU. While exist-
ing research has neglected the differences between the
‘new generation’ trade agreements, we show that the
provisions on civil society monitoring in the EU–Peru–
Colombia agreement are less far-reaching than in other
agreements, and that this has potentially important im-
plications in practice.
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Second, we apply this analytical framework to assess
the impact of these legal commitments. Whereas aca-
demic research on the EU’s inclusion of labour norms in
trade has expanded in recent years (e.g. Marx, Wouters,
Rayp, & Beke, 2015), most studies focus on the design
of the EU’s trade-labour linkage, often comparing it to
the trade-labour linkage of the US (Campling, Harrison,
Richardson, & Smith, 2016; International Institute for
Labour Studies, 2013, 2016). Here, a distinction is of-
ten made between a ‘soft’ EU approach and a ‘hard’
US approach (Brown, 2015; Ebert & Posthuma, 2011;
Horn, Mavroidis, & Sapir 2010). While the limited num-
ber of impact analyses focus on large-N quantitative
data (Gansemans, Martens, D’Haese, & Orbie, 2017, in
this issue; Postnikov & Bastiaens, 2014) or third coun-
try level analysis (Oehri, 2015a, 2015b; Van Roozen-
daal, 2017; Vogt, 2017), we aim to delve deeper into
the case of labour rights in the agricultural sector in
Peru, considering specific sub-cases such as labour in-
spection, health and safety at work regulations, and ex-
port regimes. Moreover, we analyse the provisions on
civil society involvement, as these foresee trade union
participation and are seen by the EU as a key mechanism
to promote labour rights.
While this study has an explicit focus on the agricul-
tural export sector, we also consider the broader con-
text and evolution of labour rights in Peru. Our findings
on the labour rights commitments in the trade agree-
ment are also relevant to Colombia (and to some extent
to countries subject to other EU trade agreements), and
our analysis of its impact, for instance through civil soci-
ety involvement, is also relevant to other sectors in Peru
(and to some extent to Colombia and other trade agree-
ments). Since Peru has struggled to implement (core)
labour rights and agriculture is one of the most precar-
ious sectors, this may seem a difficult case where signifi-
cant EU impact cannot be expected. On the other hand,
there is in this case much scope for external actors to
achieve progress, and large-N studies (Postnikov & Bas-
tiaens, 2014) suggest that free trade agreements that in-
clude labour provisions do improve labour rights. Such
studies should be complementedwith detailed case stud-
ies of specific (sectors within) countries to gain more in-
depth empirical knowledge of how exactly the labour
rights commitments within the trade agreement are be-
ing implemented on the ground. While not all the find-
ings may be generalizable, they may be relevant for
further comparative analysis using the same analytical
framework as in this study. The focus on Peru is also ap-
propriate because the EU–Peru–Colombia agreement is
one of the earliest of the new generation of EU trade
agreements (signed in 2010, in force since 2013).
Methodologically, this article is based on the trade
agreement and other primary sources, secondary liter-
ature, participatory observation in an EU Domestic Ad-
visory Group (DAG) meeting of the EU–Peru–Colombia
agreement where a previous version of the article was
presented (7 April 2016) and a transnational meeting
in Brussels (8 December 2016), and most importantly
a field visit to Lima and Trujillo (February–March 2016)
which involved about 40 semi-structured interviewswith
officials from the EU, Peru and EU member states, em-
ployers and business associations, exporters, academics,
NGO representatives, activists, trade unionists and work-
ers. Interviews were also held with officials and stake-
holders in Brussels.1
The structure of the article is as follows. First, we ex-
plain our focus on the agricultural sector in Peru and pro-
vide the necessary background on this case. Second, we
draw up the analytical framework for assessing the im-
pact of the trade agreement, focusing on three distinc-
tive labour rights-related commitments. In this stage, we
find that the legal commitments are flexible and conser-
vative. Third, we examine to what extent these commit-
ments have been upheld in recent years, thereby assess-
ing the impact of the agreement in Peru. Empirical evi-
dence suggests that the labour rights commitments have
had no discernible impact. Fourth, the conclusions point
to the cautious role of the EU in engaging even with the
‘soft’ approach to promote labour rights through trade.
2. Background: Peru, Labour Rights and Agriculture
During the negotiation, ratification and implementation
phases of the EU–Peru–Colombia agreement, most of
the debate in the EU, for instance in the European Parlia-
ment, concerning labour and human rights has focused
on Colombia (see, for example, the debate on the trade
agreement in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on
22May 2012). Despite being ‘in the shadow’ of Colombia,
significant problems with labour rights exist in Peru.
The labour rights situation in Peru displays three char-
acteristics. First, the level of informality is still very high
(more than 68% in 2012 according to FORLAC, 2014). Sec-
ond, the labour law is highly fragmented. While Peru has
an elaborate labour code, legislation is dispersed, result-
ing in almost 40 different labour regulations applying to
different kinds of work (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development [OECD], 2015, pp. 87–89;
Verbeek, 2014). Third, there are serious shortcomings
with the core labour standards (CLS). Peru has ratified
the eight fundamental conventions of the International
Labour Organization (ILO) on trade union rights, child
labour, forced labour and non-discrimination. However,
concerns have been raised regarding their implementa-
tion, as will be shown below.
Labour rights concerns are most prominent in the
mining and agricultural sector. While the situation in the
extractive industry has been amply documented (see, for
example, Verité, n.d.), less research has been done on
the agricultural sector (for exceptions, see, for example,
Ferm, 2008; Schuster & Maertens, 2017), even though
1 We do not reveal the names of interviewees, as several have asked us not to disclose their identity or institutions. We can provide names upon request,
if the interviewees have given permission for us to do so. When necessary, quotations from Spanish have been translated in English.
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this sector is notoriousworldwide for poorworking condi-
tions and income distribution (Cheong, Jansen, & Peters,
2013, p. 9). Another reason for focusing on agriculture
is the importance of this sector in Peru’s economy. The
agricultural export sector, especially in non-traditional
goods such as asparagus, avocado and grapes, has been
an important driver of Peru’s growing economy in the last
decade in terms of the number of companies, export vol-
ume and jobs (CEPAL, OIT, & FAO, 2012a, p. 199; Interna-
tional Commission of Jurists, 2014, pp. 12–13; Velazco &
Pinilla, 2017). In 2015, the agricultural sector as a whole
represented 7.8% of Peru’s Gross Domestic Product and
employed nearly 25% of the economically active popu-
lation in 2013 (World Bank, 2017a, 2017b). Finally, even
compared to the US market, Peru has exported a large
amount of its agricultural produce to the EU.
The Agricultural Sector Promotion Law (Law No.
27360) seems to be paramount in this story. This law
was enacted in 2000 to promote private investment and
increase competitiveness and productivity in the sector
by reducing labour costs and granting tax exemptions to
companies (CEPAL et al., 2012a, p. 228). The first article
of the law, which describes its general objective, states
that its primary purpose is to support investment and de-
velopment in the agricultural sector.
3. Analytical Framework: Flexible and Conservative
Commitments
In order to be able to assess the impact of the trade
agreement’s labour rights provisions, we need to spec-
ify what exactly the treaty partners have committed to.
Surprisingly, very little research has been conducted so
far to analyse precisely what the Parties have commit-
ted to within the different EU trade agreements. De-
spite several ambiguities in the legal text of the agree-
ment, we can discern three basic commitments: (1) up-
holding ILO CLS, (2) not lowering domestic labour law,
and (3) promoting civil society involvement. Below, we
will specify each of these commitments with reference
to the legal text; taken together, this constitutes our
analytical framework for assessing impact in the next
section. The framework is analytical (but not theoreti-
cal or conceptual) as it summarises various specific tex-
tual commitments in three broad categories, which then
serves to structure the empirical analysis. Despite differ-
ences in precise legal provisions, the same framework
can therefore also be used to analyse labour rights com-
mitments in other new generation EU trade agreements.
The first and second commitments could lead to what
Van Roozendaal and Orbie (2017) call institution building
and legal improvement impact, whereas the third corre-
sponds to empowerment impact.
First, the Parties commit to complying with the four
‘core’ and universal labour rights or principles of the
1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and
Rights at Work. Each of these four corresponds to two
ILO conventions: freedom of association and the effec-
tive recognition of the right to collective bargaining (Con-
ventions No. 87 and 98), the elimination of forced or
compulsory labour (No. 29 and No. 105), the abolition
of child labour (No. 138 and No. 182) and the elimina-
tion of discrimination in respect of employment and oc-
cupation (No. 100 and No. 111). In the chapter on trade
and sustainable development of the EU–Peru–Colombia
trade agreement, each Party commits itself to ‘the pro-
motion and effective implementation in its laws and prac-
tice and in its whole territory’ (Art. 269.3) of these ILO
CLS. The agreement does not explicitly stipulate that rati-
fication of the eight ILO conventions is necessary. Prior to
securing its market access through this trade agreement,
Peru was a beneficiary of the EU’s unilateral Generalised
System of Preferences Plus (GSP+). This system includes
a social conditionality regime that requires the ‘ratifica-
tion and effective implementation’ of all ILO core conven-
tions (Velluti, 2015). GSP preferences may be partly or
completely withdrawn when compliance with these con-
ventions is lacking. Therefore, the legal enforcement pro-
visions in the trade agreement are weaker compared to
those in the previous trade regime under the GSP+. That
said, in practice, also under the GSP+, the EU has rarely
resorted to withdrawal of preferences. Peru had already
ratified the relevant ILO conventions in 2002 and there
are no indications that the GSP+ has improved the imple-
mentation of labour rights in the country (Orbie & Tortell,
2009, pp. 677–678). However, the point remains that it
has become more difficult to sanction non-compliance
with the ILO conventions, which may be relevant pro-
vided that there is sufficient political will within the EU
to take such steps.
Second, the Parties make a strong commitment not
to lower de jure or de facto the level of protection pro-
vided in the labour law, at least not in a way that would
foster trade or investment. The obligation to ‘uphold-
ing levels of protection’ is written down very clearly in
Art. 277. It states that ‘no Party shall waive or otherwise
derogate from its environmental and labour laws in a
manner that reduces the protection afforded in those
laws, to encourage trade or investment’ (Art. 277.1), and
that ‘A Party shall not fail to effectively enforce its envi-
ronmental and labour laws through a sustained or recur-
ring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting
trade or investment between the Parties’ (Art. 277.2). It
is clear that this commitment concerns not only the de
jure level of protection, but also de facto enforcement or
any other forms of derogation to the level of protection
that the law seeks to establish.
While this broadens the scope of this commitment,
there is also a limitation in that there needs to be an im-
pact of the non-lowering on trade and investment. The
difficulty is not only that one has to prove that there has
been a weakening of labour standards, but also that this
has been done in such a way that trade and/or invest-
ment has been encouraged. Both the intentionality be-
hind such measures and their economic impact on trade
and investment are difficult to demonstrate.
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In addition, the Parties’ right to regulate is stressed.
They have ‘the right…to a reasonable exercise of discre-
tion with regard to decisions on resource allocation re-
lating to investigation, control and enforcement of do-
mestic…labour regulations and standards, while not un-
dermining the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken
under this Title’ (Art. 277.3) and ‘Nothing in this Title
shall be construed to empower the authorities of a Party
to undertake labour…law enforcement activities in the
territory of another Party’ (Art. 277.4). These provisions
aim to establish limitations against international inter-
ference in the domestic regulation and application of
labour rights.
Third, civil society meetings should take place in or-
der to discuss and monitor these commitments to sus-
tainable development (cf. empowerment impact). These
meetings should be organised at two levels: domestically
(within each Party) and transnationally (involving civil
society from each Party). The domestic mechanisms of
each Party (see Art. 281) should ‘have a balanced rep-
resentation’. Their task seems to extend beyond merely
discussing the implementation of the chapter on trade
and sustainable development: they ‘may submit opin-
ions and recommendations on the implementation of
this Title, including on their own initiatives’. Such a do-
mestic mechanism is often called a DAG. The transna-
tional mechanism is organised in the context of the an-
nualmeeting of the Parties’ Sub-committee on Trade and
Sustainable Development, which is the intergovernmen-
tal body that oversees the implementation of this chap-
ter. The same stakeholders as in the domestic mecha-
nism should be given the opportunity to participate in
these sessions. These are open meetings to which the
public at large can also attend. The purpose is ‘to carry
out a dialogue’ between civil society and governments
on the implementation of the chapter on trade and sus-
tainable development.
Again, as with the two previous commitments, there
is a significant degree of flexibility for governments.
A comparative analysis (using the database of Martens,
Van den Putte, Oehri, & Orbie, 2018) shows that these
provisions are more constrained than in most other
agreements (for a detailed analysis see Orbie & Van den
Putte, 2016). Among other things, the governments are
not obliged to establish a new domestic mechanism to
monitor this chapter on trade and sustainable develop-
ment (Art. 281), the provisions for the domestic mech-
anism do not specify that members need to be ‘inde-
pendent’ (Art. 281) and overall the agreement provides
a great deal of leeway for governments to organise the
meetings as they see fit (Art. 281). Many of the other re-
cent trade agreements are more explicit on the need to
establish a newmechanism (such as the EU–Korea agree-
ment) or stress the need for independent membership.
In conclusion, the labour rights commitments are
conservative and flexible. By ‘conservative’, we mean
that they mostly aim to maintain the status quo (e.g. on
domestic labour law and civil society mechanisms). No
specific and additional labour reforms are required, nor
is it necessary to establish a new civil society mecha-
nism. By ‘flexible’, we mean that there is much leeway
for the governments when it comes to labour protection
at the domestic level and the functioning of the civil soci-
ety mechanisms. Specifically, on upholding CLS and non-
lowering domestic labour law, there is a significant de-
gree of flexibility for governments, provided that (1) do-
mestic labour protection is consistent with the ILO CLS,
and (2) a reduced de jure or de facto level of protection
does not serve to foster trade or investment. On promot-
ing civil society dialogue, there is a significant degree of
flexibility for governments, provided that (1) a domestic
committee or group should exist, (2) it should be con-
sulted by its government, and (3) the same stakehold-
ers should be given the opportunity to participate in the
transnational meeting.
4. Assessing Impact
In order to assess the impact of the labour rights commit-
ments in the trade agreement, this section will systemat-
ically apply this analytical framework to the de facto sit-
uation of labour rights in Peru (with specific reference to
the agricultural sector).
4.1. Upholding ILO CLS
Even though Peru has ratified the eight ILO core con-
ventions, serious shortcomings can be noticed when it
comes to the ‘implementation in practice’, as required
in Art. 269.3. Reports and indicators from international
institutions show that practices of child labour, forced
labour, discrimination and violations of trade union
rights continue to exist in Peru, and this is also the case
in the agricultural sector.Wemake a distinction between
‘process or enabling rights’ such as trade union rights and
‘outcome rights’ such as the eradication of child labour as
the former should enable the latter.
When it comes to child labour and forced labour,
33.5% of children aged five to 14 are engaged in child
labour (UNICEF, n.d.; United Nations Development Pro-
gramme, 2015). Most of them work in the agricultural
sector or on the street. An estimated 0.218% of the pop-
ulation in Peru is in modern slavery (Walk Free Foun-
dation, 2014). Interestingly, these shortcomings have al-
ready been reported by the European Commission. In its
assessment report on the GSP+ scheme, the Commission
analyses Peru’s compliance with the eight conventions,
partly relying on the findings of the ILO expert bodies (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2016). It concludes that ‘Peru has
been taking several steps and has made some progress
in implementing the ILO core labour standards’, in partic-
ular regarding forced labour and child labour. However,
it also finds that ‘Peru faces problems in practically im-
plementing and enforcing the fundamental conventions’
and that ‘stronger efforts are required’ (European Com-
mission, 2016, p. 260). Furthermore, Mujica argues that
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although there have been improvements in the national
policies on child labour and forced labour, there continue
to be problems in practice (2015, pp. 8–10).
When it comes to trade union rights, there is no clear
evidence of any progress: quite the contrary. Trade union
rights, as covered under ILO Conventions 87 and 98 on
freedomof association and collective bargaining, are fun-
damental as they can create an enabling environment to
protect other labour rights. Through the empowerment
of workers, improvements in ‘outcome rights’ such as
child labour can be expected (Barrientos & Smith, 2007;
Lieberwitz, 2006).
Peru was given a rating of four by the International
Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) in the 2017 Global
Rights Index; this rating is given to countries where sys-
tematic violations are reported (ITUC, 2017). In such
countries, the government and/or companies continu-
ously threaten workers’ fundamental rights by making
serious efforts to crush their collective voice. Relying on
ILO reports, the European Commission also produced a
critical evaluation of trade union rights in Peru.
Our interviews with workers and trade union repre-
sentatives in Lima and Trujillo confirmed these obstacles
to strike, to join a trade union, to bargain collectively, and
to take legal action against trade union discrimination,
also in the agricultural sector. For example, several inter-
viewees mentioned that some workers did not receive
a new contract because they were affiliated to a trade
union, and that some were forced to de-unionise in or-
der to see their contract renewed. They also mentioned
practices whereby union representatives are framed for
allegedly engaging in fraudulent practices in order to
damage their credibility. Other violations of trade union
rights include the alleged practice of drawing up ‘black
lists’ of trade unionists, whichmakes it almost impossible
for dismissed workers to find another job. These intervie-
wees confirm practices that have also been documented
in other reports (Fonds voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerk-
ing, 2015; International Commission of Jurists, 2014). For
example, the general survey by the ITUC mentions sev-
eral anti-union practices in agricultural export companies
in 2014, with violent repression and detainment of work-
ers at CAMPOSOL and the sacking of a newly elected
trade union leader at TALSA2 (ITUC, n.d.).
Several explanations for these alleged violations can
be given. Interviewees often point to the widespread
use of temporary contracts. Specifically for the agricul-
tural sector, there is the special law for the promotion
of agricultural export products, Law No. 27360, under
which workers enjoy only half of the workers’ benefits
provided under the general labour law (see below). Ac-
cording to several sources, including a prominent labour
lawyer, this law is used beyond its original rationale. For
example, temporary contracts are allowed to accommo-
date the specificities of seasonal labour in agriculture.
However, large agricultural export companies cultivate
several products all year round and employ the same
labourers for these different products (see also Mujica,
2015). By hiring workers permanently on a temporary
contract, it is farmore difficult for them to organise them-
selves. More fundamentally, there is a strong anti-union
climate in Peru, going back to historical episodes of polit-
ical violence and economic collapse in the 1980s, which
have been linked to trade union activities, and to the sub-
sequent repressive reactions during President Fujimori’s
tenure (1990–2000). According to Mujica (2015, p. 10),
the government (referring to the Humala government,
2011–2016) lacks the capacity andwillingness to address
this issue. He emphasises that this is not a problem of in-
dividual cases of violations of trade union rights, but that
there has been a systematic policy behind the violations
by the Peruvian governments. According to a European
NGO representative with long expertise in labour rights
in Peru, the situation for trade unions has actually wors-
ened in recent years. The labour movement also suffers
from internal divisions, as we witnessed in the agricul-
tural sector in Trujillo and also in the representation of
the unions in Lima.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the level of union-
isation is extremely low in Peru. Peruvian unions never
regained the status they enjoyed during the pre-Fujimori
era (Gil Piedra & Grompone Velásquez, 2014; Sulmont
Samain, 2006). Trade union density was 4.2% in 2012
(ILO, n.d.). The figures are even lower in agriculture. In
2010, of 98,467 unionised people in the private sector,
only 2,651 were agricultural workers. So while union-
isation is already very low at the national level, it is
even lower in the agricultural sector, which represents
only 2.69% of all unionised people in Peru (RedGe, 2012,
p. 24). In 2010, about 1.4–1.7% of workers in the agri-
cultural sector were unionised. In the Ica region, there
used to be twelve trade unions, whereas now there
are only two organisations that could be regarded as
trade unions.
In the agricultural export sector, it should be noted
that CAMPOSOL negotiated a collective labour agree-
ment in December 2015. This agreement deals inter alia
with economic benefits, labour conditions, health, CSR
and union issues. However, trade union representatives
at CAMPOSOL state that in practice, the social situation
at CAMPOSOL is no better than at other agricultural ex-
port companies.
Whether these shortcomings represent a lack of ‘im-
plementation in practice’ as required in the agreement
remains difficult to determine, as the EU and its trading
partners have not established clear benchmarks to eval-
uate gradations of implementation. In the context of the
GSP(+), it has been noticed that the EU only resorts to
sanctions when the ILO has established a Commission of
Inquiry, which constitutes the highest level of condemna-
tion (Orbie & Tortell, 2009, p. 676); this does not mean
that the threshold for identifying violations of the core
labour rights should be set so high (Vogt, 2015). While
the above-mentioned violations seem serious and sys-
2 CAMPOSOL and TALSA are major agricultural exporters in the La Libertad region.
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tematic, the EU could engage in a reflection with its trad-
ing partners, civil society and the ILO on when exactly
the core labour rights commitments are properly (even
if never completely) implemented.
4.2. Non-Lowering Domestic Labour Law
Our research indicates three sub-cases where the labour
protection has been lowered since the entry into force
of the trade agreement with the EU: (1) de facto weak-
ening of labour inspection; (2) de facto continuation of
special (labour) regimes; (3) de jure lowering of health
and safety at work. However, it remains difficult to as-
certain whether this has an (intended) impact on trade
or investment. Interestingly, in July 2015 a public sub-
mission was filed with the US Department of Labor by
international NGOs and Peruvian workers’ organisations,
among others, under the US-Peru trade agreement (In-
ternational Labor Rights Forum, 2015). The main allega-
tion concerned the failure of the Peruvian government
to effectively enforce its labour laws in the textile and
agricultural sectors. While some consultation has taken
place, the issue is still pending. No official public submis-
sion system exists under the EU agreement.
4.2.1. De FactoWeakening of Labour Inspection
While Peru has one of the most regulated labour mar-
kets in the world, it is among the countries with the low-
est level of compliance with labour regulation (OECD,
2015, p. 87). Although a new inspection agency, named
SUNAFIL (Superintendencia Nacional de Fiscalización
Laboral), was created in 2012, there is a widespread con-
sensus among interviewees that this agency has not func-
tioned. Since it started functioning on 1 April 2014, at
least four structural problems have been identified.
First, as emphasised by an ILO official, SUNAFIL’s re-
sources are ‘ridiculously low’. A labour lawyer stressed
that the amount of underfunding is ‘amazing’. There
are currently only about 500 labour inspectors in Peru.
SUNAFIL has 394 inspectors nationwide, ofwhich 227 are
spread over nine of the twenty-five regions (US Depart-
ment of State, 2015, p. 33). The US Department of Labor
recently requested Peru to establish SUNAFIL offices in
all regions as soon as possible (US Department of Labor,
2016, p. 19). In some regions there is only one labour in-
spector, and in the region of La Libertad there are only
nine inspectors although this is a major agricultural ex-
port region where more than 80,000 companies are ac-
tive (Mujica, 2015, p. 14).
Second, SUNAFIL does not function autonomously
from the Peruvian government and itsMinistry of Labour.
According to a former official of this ministry, in 2014
the government deliberately changed the management
of SUNAFIL in order to enhance its grip on the agency.
An expert in labour law states that the labour inspectors
previously based at theMinistry of Labour ‘only changed
the shirt’ and in practice ‘nothing has changed except the
logo’. As a result of the continuing efforts by the govern-
ment to control SUNAFIL, four different directors have
been appointed since its creation in 2014.
Third, independence from companies is limited. One
interviewee complained that in some cases labour in-
spectors are dependent on companies for their daily
work, giving the example of an inspector who needed
to rely on car transport provided by the company due
to the lack of any transport of his own. Lack of fuel and
transport, having to pay for transportation and being de-
nied access to businesses are general problems for in-
spectors in Peru (US Department of Labor, 2014, p. 4).
According to one interviewee, some labour inspectors
have been hired by the companies that they previously
needed to inspect.
Fourth, SUNAFIL’s sanctioning power is limited. A law
was passed determining that henceforth a ‘preventive
approach’ would be taken to promoting labour rights in
Peru. Instead of sanctioning companies that do not com-
ply with labour law, the idea is to work on corrective
measures that would be more effective in the long run.
If SUNAFIL finds an employer to be in violation of labour
law, this employer has three years to prevent and cor-
rect the violations (US Department of State, 2014, p. 38).
At the same time, the new law has weakened the crim-
inal responsibilities of employers for accidents at the
workplace. Criminal penalties are limited to ‘those cases
where employers have ‘deliberately’ violated safety and
health laws andwhere labour authorities have previously
notified employers who have chosen not to adopt mea-
sures in response to a repeated infraction’ (US Depart-
ment of State, 2015, p. 34; see also below on the new
health and safety law).
Interestingly, the ‘weakening’ of labour inspections
has been recognised by the European Commission in its
GSP+ report (European Commission, 2016, p. 257). The
report points to new economic measures by the govern-
ment ‘that have limited the capacity for action of labour
inspection’. An ILO official also confirmed that ‘while the
goal of the creation of SUNAFIL was to have a better
labour inspection, in practice it has become worse be-
cause of a lack of resources’.
4.2.2. De Facto Continuation of Special (Labour)
Regimes
Second, the continuation of the Agricultural Sector Pro-
motion Law (Law No. 27360) and the blocking of the
project for a unified labour law might be seen as going
against the commitments in the chapter on trade and sus-
tainable development. The special export regime for agri-
culture has existed since 2000 and was renewed in 2006
until the end of 2021. As stated before, the primary ob-
jective of the law was to support investment and devel-
opment of the agricultural sector. The labour movement
criticises the law for the flexibility that it provides to em-
ployers in the agricultural sector compared to the gen-
eral labour law (e.g. halving holiday entitlements, longer
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working hours and lower compensation for unfair dis-
missal) (CEPAL et al., 2012b, p. 289).
Several sources also indicate that the law is no longer
necessary, since its original objective was reached in
the first ten years of its functioning (International Com-
mission of Jurists, 2014, p. 9). Indeed, the purpose of
the agricultural export law was to provide opportunities
to Peruvian producers to integrate in the international
economy. According to the International Commission of
Jurists (2014), the law provides ‘highly flexible contract
systems that favour investment but at the same time pro-
mote precarious employment and discourage the forma-
tion of trade unions’. It further states that the law re-
duces the level of workers’ protection with the aim of
encouraging investment and promoting the growth of
agro-exports. Precisely for this reason, a labour lawyer
also posited that the law is unfair: it provides fewer ben-
efits for the same work, solely to lower the labour cost
for companies.
Over the past 15 years, the Peruvian labour law has
become so fragmented that ‘the exception has become
the rule’. The general labour law has been hollowed out
and, according to one interviewee, applies to only about
10% of employees. In 2013, about 7% of all formally em-
ployed workers in Peru were working under the agricul-
tural export law (Mujica, 2015, p. 6). There have been
several attempts to streamline the agricultural export
law, alongside other exceptional regimes, into one Gen-
eral Labour Law. Soon after the reinstatement of the
‘Consejo Nacional de Trabajo y Promocion de Empleo’
(or General Council of Labour and Promotion of Employ-
ment) (CNTPE, hereafter: National Council) in 2001, at-
tempts weremade to agree on a unified labour law (Min-
isterio de Trabajo Peru, n.d.). In 2011, newattemptswere
undertaken. While in 2012 there was allegedly a consen-
sus on about 90% of the articles, there is no political will
from the government, and there is also opposition to the
project from the employers’ side (Fernandez-Maldonado
Mujica, 2015, p. 153; PLADES, 2014, p. 14). While the
employers’ side aimed to continue the discussion in the
National Council, the labour groups wanted the Peruvian
government to resolve outstanding issues.
It remains to be seen whether the agricultural ex-
port law will be extended again after 2021, something
which two interviewees mentioned as a likely scenario.
Meanwhile, the Peruvian Association of Exporters has re-
quested the prolongation of Law No. 27360 until 2041,
something for which President Kuczynski (in office since
2016) has already expressed support (Perú 21, 2016).
Nonetheless, labour reform does not seem to be one of
this President’s priorities (Inside US Trade, 2016).
4.2.3. De Jure Lowering of Health and Safety at Work
The revision of the law on safety and health at work con-
stitutes a clear example of a de jureweakening of labour
law in Peru. Notably, this has happened since the en-
try into force of the trade agreement. In 2011, a law on
safety and health at work was approved (LawNo. 29783).
It was considered to be a progressive law that had been
elaborated with input from the labour movement. How-
ever, the new law was considered to bring along too
many implementation costs for companies, which lob-
bied for its modification. As a result, it was amended in
July 2014 (Law No. 30222), shortly after it entered into
force (in April 2014). It was changed on several points,
such as the frequency with which medical checks need
to take place, and the need for redeployment within the
same company following an industrial accident. Impor-
tantly, as mentioned above, the criminal responsibility
of employers in the case of accidents at the workplace
was lowered, making it less likely that accidents will lead
to sanctions. Instead, the new law opts for a ‘preven-
tive approach’. This is an important aspect because in
the construction sector alone there is at least one casu-
alty per month. In addition, the modification of the law
was passed without its submission to tripartite dialogue
(PLADES, 2014, p. 14).
Although it seems clear that these modifications
have weakened the level of labour protection, evalua-
tions of the nature of these changes vary from being
‘rather small’ (according to a labour lawyer) to being
‘(very) significant’ (according to NGOs and the labour
movement). Trade unionists in the agricultural export
sector state that the new law is not known or at least
not applied by employers.
Similar to the creation of SUNAFIL, the original law
on safety and health was one of the electoral promises
made by President Humala (2011–2016). Again, how-
ever, his centre-left government proved unable or un-
willing to implement the initiative. In the same context,
it should be noted that more progressive members of
the Ministry were dismissed and that a new Minister of
Labour, who was considered to be closer to the busi-
ness community, was installed. Because the economic
and the political elite in Peru are closely interwoven,
it becomes difficult even for centre-left politicians to
create and enforce regulations and institutions that im-
prove labour rights. This is further reinforced by the anti-
union climate in Peru and the general Atlanticist, free
trade orientation that has characterised the country in
recent years.
These three sub-cases show that there are deficien-
cies in the law and practice of labour rights in Peru. How-
ever, it is more difficult to assess whether this violates
the commitments in the trade agreement (see Table 1).
In the cases of labour inspection and safety and health,
there has been a de facto and de jure lowering of protec-
tion; however, it is difficult to ascertain whether this has
(intentionally) encouraged trade or investment (with the
EU). In the case of the special agricultural sector promo-
tion law, it is clear that a flexible labour regime has been
established in order to stimulate export competitiveness;
however, this system predates the entry into force of the
trade agreement with the EU. In general, it is very dif-
ficult to prove that changes in labour rights protection
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Table 1. Summary of compliance with domestic labour law commitments
Lowering since 2013 Encourage trade/investment
Labour inspection Yes (de facto) ?
Special regimes No (to be checked after 2021) Yes
Health and safety Yes (de jure) ?
were put in place in order to encourage trade or invest-
ment. As such, the potential of the non-lowering clause
in EU trade agreements seems rather compromised.
4.3. Promoting Civil Society Dialogue
The trade agreement provides that each Party ‘shall con-
sult domestic labour and environment or sustainable de-
velopment committees or groups, or create such commit-
tees or groups when they do not exist’ (Art. 281). The Pe-
ruvian government has opted not to create a new group
but instead to consult existing committees. In the area of
labour rights, this is the National Council. This decision
does not go against the letter of the agreement, which
also provides that ‘the constitution and consultation of
such committees or groups…shall be in accordance with
domestic law’ (Art. 281). However, in practice three is-
sues emerge.
First, there is a consensus among our interviews
with (former) members of the National Council that the
domestic mechanism does not effectively exist (RedGe,
n.d.). One civil society actor said that it is an ineffec-
tive space where ‘you should send issues you don’t want
to succeed’. This was confirmed by an ILO representa-
tive who called the National Council ‘ineffective, irreg-
ular and more consultative than deliberative’. The Na-
tional Council seems to have become paralysed in the
last two or three years. Several interviewees indicated
that they did not know whether it had been convening
again regularly or not.
Trade unionist (former) members complain that
the government consistently ignores recommendations
made by the National Council. In addition, they state
that laws are being passed without consultation with the
National Council, which did not even discuss the trade
agreement with the EU. Some members, including some
trade unions, havewithdrawn from the Council in protest
at this state of affairs. Some trade unionists argue that it
only exists to give Peru an international image of social
dialogue and is only there for photo opportunities. In ad-
dition, the National Council is not an independent mech-
anism. It is chaired by the Ministry of Labour, its con-
vocation depends on the will of the Minister of Labour,
and the presence of government officials in the meet-
ings further jeopardises its autonomous functioning. This
was confirmed by several interviewees. The European
Economic and Social Committee (EESC) laments the pres-
ence of government representatives as going against the
nature of such mechanisms as civil society bodies (EESC,
2016). This is not contrary to the letter of the agree-
ment, however. Contrary to the EU agreement with Cen-
tral America (Art. 294(4–5)), for example, the provisions
on the domestic civil society mechanism do not specify
that the members need to be ‘independent’.
Second, from our interviews there are no indications
that the implementation of the chapter on trade and sus-
tainable development is discussed in this forum. In fact,
the members of the Council whom we interviewed were
not aware that, since the entry into force of the trade
agreement with the EU, they were tasked with the moni-
toring of this chapter. A representative of a major union
in the agricultural sector was surprised to hear that the
Council was also supposed to play such a role. Several
EUDAGmembers confirmed that their Peruvian partners
were not aware of a domestic mechanism. The EESC re-
cently also lamented the fact that the Peruvian mecha-
nism has never met to discuss the sustainable develop-
ment aspects of the trade agreement with the EU (EESC,
2016). Interviewees in Peru are sometimes aware of the
transnational meetings, but they do not know that there
should also be a domestic component.
Taking all this into account, it is not surprising that
the National Council has ostensibly not submitted any
‘opinions’ or ‘recommendations’ on the implementa-
tion of the chapter on trade and sustainable develop-
ment, a possibility that is provided for in the agreement
(Art. 281). The only coordinated initiative from civil soci-
ety about the implementation of this chapter concerns
a letter written by RedGe (Red Peruana por una Global-
ización con Equidad) and signed by 13 civil society organ-
isations, addressed to the Head of the EU Delegation in
Lima (RedGe, 2015). This letter expresses concerns about
the deterioration of labour and environmental rights and
criticises various changes to the law and policy. In addi-
tion, the authors request the EU to put these issues on
the agenda of the intergovernmental Sub-Committee on
Trade and Sustainable Development.
The non-functioning of the Peruvian DAG has been
lamented by its EU counterpart. The EU DAG sent a letter
to the Peruvian government asking for more information
about the composition of the Peruvian (and Colombian)
DAG so that the European DAG could contact its counter-
parts to coordinate (Iuliano, 2015). There has not been
an official reply to this letter, but the Peruvian govern-
ment has made it clear that issues related to social di-
alogue are a purely internal Peruvian matter. This was
also made clear to us by the Peruvian Ministry of Trade.
The EU Delegation in Lima also confirmed that, when re-
quested for more information about the domestic civil
society mechanism, such as the frequency of its meet-
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ings, the participating members, the agenda etc., the
Peruvian government replied ‘this is not your business’.
While the treaty does not require the Peruvian govern-
ment to provide this information, our interviews indicate
that consultation has not taken place, which goes against
the letter of Art. 281.
Third, the commitment to allow domestic stakehold-
ers the opportunity to participate in the transnational
sessions is also not being implemented (Art 282.2). Pe-
ruvian civil society has been underrepresented in the
transnational civil society meetings. Thus far, three
transnational civil society meetings have taken place in
the context of the annual meeting of the Sub-Committee
on Trade and Sustainable Development. The first meet-
ing (Lima, in 2014) is generally seen as substandard or
even ‘terrible’ as it was more a debriefing about the
trade agreement than a true dialogue; what’s more, as
the meeting of the Sub-Committee was delayed by more
than three hours, there was no time for the governments
to really listen to civil society. In addition, the translation
system did not work properly. The representative of one
of the main union federations indicated that he had only
been informed about the meeting two or three days ear-
lier, which of course hampered effective preparation. Al-
though the second meeting (Bogotá, in 2015) was eval-
uated as more substantial by some observers, no mem-
bers of Peruvian civil society were present. Their absence
was due to various factors, including their lack of capacity,
limited budgets, and other priorities; yet it seems clear
that the Peruvian government had not facilitated their in-
volvement in any way. Several of our interviewees from
Peruvian civil society as well as somemembers of the EU
DAG confirmed that there had been no announcements
by the authorities in Peru in relation to the transnational
meeting. The third meeting (Brussels, in 2016) was de-
scribed by the organisers as an historic achievement be-
cause civil society representatives from all three coun-
tries were present. This claim should, however, be put
into perspective. Peruvian civil society participation was
very limited and no Colombian civil society participated;
a Dutch organisation represented Colombian interests in-
stead. In addition, video conferencing wasmeant to over-
come the distance and related funding issues. However,
the link did not work until half way through the meet-
ing. The dysfunctionality of the Peruvian National Coun-
cil and presence of officials during its meetings were re-
peatedly criticised; however, the Peruvian officials made
it clear that there were no prospects of a new ad hoc
mechanism (in contrast to Colombia). In conclusion, the
research shows that the Peruvian government failed to
empower a domestic mechanism that can perform the
monitoring role effectively, to consult this group, and to
facilitate its participation in the transnational meetings.
This should be seen in the context of a general unwilling-
ness to include civil society actors in the discussions on
the implementation of the trade agreement.
In sum, it seems that the restrictive legal provisions
on civil society meetings, which grants considerable lee-
way to the Peruvian government (see Section 3), have
an impact on the de facto involvement of civil society.
While it has yet to be determined whether the meet-
ings function more effectively in practice under EU trade
agreements with more far-reaching provisions on civil
society involvement, ongoing research on the EU–Korea
and EU–Central America agreements suggests that this
is the case. At least, Korean and Central American DAG
members are aware of their role in the trade agreements,
linkages with the transnational meetings are more estab-
lished, and the independence of members is less con-
tested. European Commission officials whom we inter-
viewed also admitted that it was a mistake not to specify
that DAGmembers need to be independent, adding that
this had been remedied in subsequent agreements.
5. Conclusions
This article has shown that the EU’s legal improvement,
institution building and empowerment impact in promot-
ing labour rights through its trade agreement with Peru
has been non-existent. First, the legal provisions were
drafted in a conservative way that leaves ample flexibil-
ity for the Peruvian government, even compared to other
EU agreements. Second, these provisions have not been
fully implemented and have even been violated in a num-
ber of cases. We identified serious shortcomings with
the implementation of ILO core conventions, the lower-
ing of domestic labour law, including labour inspection,
and the near-absence of civil society dialogues. While it
may be too early to drawdefinite conclusions, as ongoing
large-N studies suggest that promotional labour clauses
may reduce breaches of labour rights in the long run, this
detailed sector and interview-based case study of Peru’s
compliancewith core labour rights, health and safety reg-
ulations, labour inspection, export promotion regimes
and civil societymechanisms illustrates the complexity of
EU trading partners’ compliance with labour rights com-
mitments. In addition to its empirical contribution, the
article has, we hope, set the stage for further compara-
tive analysis with other sectors and countries by making
use of the proposed analytical framework.
In terms of explanations for the non-impact of the
trade agreement, we can point to the role of the Pe-
ruvian government, interests of the agro-export sector,
and the traditional anti-union climate. In addition, it is
clear that the EUhas not strongly insisted onmore robust
provisions in the chapter on trade and sustainable de-
velopment and that it has been relatively responsive to
the Peruvian and Columbian governments’ reservations
in this regard. The EU’s reluctance to take firm action
against violations of trading partners’ (core) labour rights
already characterised the GSP+ trading regime with Peru
that preceded the trade agreement (even if theoretically
the former system was more enforceable through trade
sanctions). Officials interviewed at the Commission’s DG
Trade concede that some language in the chapter on
trade and sustainable development should have been
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stronger and suggest that they have taken these lessons
into account for subsequent agreements. To what extent
this has indeed been the case and what this means for
the practical application of labour rights remains to be
studied in further research.
Although there are inherent limits to what trade
agreements can achieve in terms of promoting labour
rights, the EU could clearly have pushedmore in both the
negotiation and the implementation of the trade agree-
ment (see Orbie & Van den Putte, 2016). For instance,
during the trade negotiations the EU could have in-
sisted on specific reforms in areas such as labour inspec-
tion (pre-ratification conditionality), and could have de-
manded the inclusion of a social safeguard clause (when
liberalisation has unforeseen negative consequences) as
well as sanctions as a last resort. During the implementa-
tion, it could insist more on getting information about
the existence and functioning of the DAG within Peru
(within the intergovernmental Sub-Committee on Trade
and Sustainable Development), it could enhance the ef-
fective functioning of the civil society meetings (through
budgetary and administrative support), it could foster co-
herence with its own development cooperation policy
in Peru (which also involves civil society dialogue, albeit
independently from the trade agreement), and engage
in cooperation with other actors such as the US (which
has filed a complaint against labour rights violations in
Peru) and the ILO (which has the relevant expertise but
is not formally involved). Given the rising politicisation
of trade policy, the debates on the sustainable develop-
ment dimension of free trade agreements are undoubt-
edly going to continue and the European Commission
has recently published some interesting ideas in a non-
paper on this topic (Barbu et al., 2017; European Com-
mission, 2017).
When observers and academics characterise the EU’s
approach as being ‘soft’, they usually refer to the ab-
sence of sanctions (Campling et al., 2016; Horn et al.,
2010; International Institute for Labour Studies, 2013,
2016; Vogt, 2014). However, this analysis shows that
even when we leave the sanctions debate aside, the EU
is being soft in the sense that it does not seriously imple-
ment its promotional approach. Even without changing
the existing treaty provisions, the EU could push much
harder to realise its soft approach.
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